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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN H. MORGAN, JR., JUSTHEIM PETROLEUM CO.,
a Nevada corporation, CLARENCE I.
JUSTHEIM and J. H. MORGAN, SR.,
Plaint-iffs and Respondents,
vs.
UT AH BOARD OF STATE LANDS,
CHARLES R. HANSEN, CECIL THOMSON, D 0 NA L D SHOWALTER, M. V.
HATCH, HAROLD REESE, WHITNEY
J. FLOYD, PHILLIP CHRISTENSEN, T.
H. BELL and W. L. TUELLER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12131

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Thi'S case, on its facts and as to the issues of law involved, 'is essentially identical to Morgan, et al. v. Utah
Board of State Lands, et al., 21 Utah 2d 364, 445 P. 2d 776
( 1968). (This case, in the interest of brevity, is hereinafter referred to, identified and cited as "the 1968 Morgan
case".) If the words "oil shale" are substituted for "bituminous sands" in the fiirst two paragraphs of the opinion of
Justice Tuckett, that statement fairly states the facts and
holding of the District Court in this case.
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This action was brought by plaintiffs (Respondents)
m the District Court to enjoin defendants (Appellants)
from issuing oil shale leases on top of existing leases issued
for the same purpose and the same mineral. Two District
Judges (Judge Hall and Judge Wilkins) held that the de.
cision of this Court in the 1968 Morgan case, supra, was
controlling. Both Judge Hall and Judge W!ilkins heard evidence, made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law (R. 73-75; 106-110) and issued injunctions directing the defendants not to issue confliicting hydrocarbon
leases as expressly prohibited by Section 65-1-18 Utah Code
Annotated, 1963, as amended by Section 2, Chapter 183,
Laws of Utah 1967. The final disposition of the case by
Judge Wilkins included the appropriate application and
construction of the said Section 65-1-18, supra. (Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 106-110.) Defendants
have appealed from those determinations.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
What defendants are actually seeking on this appeal
is another go at the same questions of law and statutory
construction definitively \Settled by thiis Court in the 1968
Morgan case, supra.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts 1in the brief of defendants is
correct as far as it goes, but is wholly and materially in·
complete and deficient.
Plaintiff:s had requested (Exh. P-1) defendants not to
proceed with issuance of oil shale leases on state landis al·

ready under lease for the same purpose and the same mineral. This precise point had been definitively settled by
this Court in an action between the same principal parties
in the 1968 Morgan case, supra. Nonethele&.S, the defendants proceed to ignore the 1968 Morgan case and undertook to issue conflicting leases. This action was brought
to enjoin defendants from doing so (R. 1-5). The Trial
Court, Judge Hall, after receiving affidavits of plaintiffs
( R. 17-20) and defendants ( R. 28-32, 35-72) and hearing
argument and briefiing of counsel (R. 73) made and entered
his Flindings of Fact and Conclmsions of Law (R. 73-75)
and issued a Prelim1inary Injunction (R. 76-77). After a
full trial of the issues (R. 113-248) and argument of counsel, the Trial Court, Judge Wilkins, also made and entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 106-110) and
entered Judgment (R. 98-99) making the injunction permanent and, in the matrix of his findings of fact, construing
Section 65-1-18 Utah Code Annotated (1970 Supp.), in
harmony with this Court's determination in the 1968
Morgan case. (Chapter 183 of Laws of Utah 1967 is hereinafter referred to, identified and cited as "the 1967 Legislative Amendments".)
The issues of fact were vigorously contested and argued. Both District Court judges made formal findings of
fact. After hearing all of the evidence, and reviewing the
rlocuments and considering the arguments of counsel, Judge
Wilkins determined, as to the two dispositive issues, as
follows:
"That the mineral or minerals recoverable from oil
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shale in the Green River Formation underlying certain lands in Utah is the same mineral as is or the
same minerals as are recoverable from Hquid petroleum in the said Green River Formation, to wit, oil
and/or gasoline and/or distillates." (Findings of
Fact, Number 3, R. 107.)
And
"That the 'Purpose' within the language, meaning
and intent of Section 65-1-18 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, a'.3 amended by Section 2, Chapter 183, Laws
of Utah 1967, of each of the following mineral leases
issued by defendant Utah Board of State Lands on
Utah State lands, is the same and identical, to wit,
the exploration, development or recovery of oil:
'Oil and Gas Lease', 'Asphaltic Sands-Bituminous
Sands Lease', 'Oil Shale Lease' and 'Oil, Gas and
Hydrocarbon Lease.' " (Finding of Fact Number
4, R. 108.)
See, also, Finding Number 1, and Finding Number 2, R. 106107; Findings of Judge Hall, R. 73-74.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED.
It 'is well established law that the fiindings and judg·

ment of the trial court are presumed val'id, will only be
overturned if clearly unsupported by the evidence, the evi·
dence before the Trial Court will be reviewed in the light

6

most favorable to the findings and judgment below, and the
appellant has the burden of challenging and overcoming
these presumptions. See e.g., Hayward, et al. v. Pennock,
et al., 21 Utah 2d 242, 444 P. 2d 59 (1968); Oelerich v.
Oelcrich, 15 Utah 2d 409, 393 P. 2d 799 (1964); De Vas v.
Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P. 2d 290 (1962); Charlton v.
Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P. 2d 176 (1961).
See, also, Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F. 2d 37 4, 377 (10th
Cir., 1966); Weaver v. United States, 334 F. 2d 319, 320321 (10th Cir. 1964); Rapid Transit Co. v. United States,
295 F. 2d 465, 466 (10th Cir. 1961); Hoff v. United States,
268 F. 2d 646, 647 (10th Cir. 1959).
The fact findings of the District Judges are fully supported by competent evidence. The defendants have not
challenged either the Findings or the competency and adequacy of the evidence on which these Findings are based.
Accordingly, the Findings should not be overturned on appeal.
POINT II.
SINCE THE 1967 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS, THE DEFENDANTS MAY CONVERT
EXISTING LEASES FOR OTHER HYDROCARBON LEASES, BUT MAY ISSUE ONLY ONE
NEW LEASE FOR HYDROCARBONS, VIZ., AN
"OIL, GAS AND HYDROCARBON" LEASE.
Senate Bill 77, adopted by the Utah Legislature in 1967
in Section 2, employs the words, "The state land board may
issue mineral leases including without limitation oil, gas
::ind hydrocarbon leases ... " This Court, in a unanimous

ti

and carefully-reasoned
weight to the legislative
industry hearings which
of which was an exhibit

opinion, and g1vmg particular
history of Senate Bill 77 and the
preceded its passage, a transcript
in that case, held:

1

"In order to forestall disputes between the lessees
as to whether a given quantity of oil came from a
bituminous sands formation or from a natural reservoir of oil it was determined that one lease should
be 'issued which would cover all of the oil produced
on the lands regardless of the source." 21 Utah 2d
365, at 366.
And
"We are of the opinion that the Legislature by the
statute adopted in 1967 intended and did adopt the
policy of allowing but one lease for the extraction
of oil from any particular tract of public land (cit·
ing) ." 21Utah2d 364, at 367.
That determination, between essentially the same par·
ties, is sound and established law. Notwithstanding that
determination, the defendants resumed thefr prior, and prohibited, practice of issuing confl'icting leaises for hydrocar·
bons on the same land. It was this practice which gave rise
to this lawsuit.
This is not to say, nor ha'S it ever been the contention
of pla:intiffs as defendants ominously suggest, that >Such a
holding will disturb or in any way interfere with any leases
issued prior to the 1967 Legislative Amendments (see
Morgan testimony, R. 215-216), and this Court did not so
hold in the 1968 Morgan case. Nor do the 1967 Legislative
Amendments and the 1968 Morgan case in any way pre·
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elude the defendants from converting leases issued prior to
1967 to hydrocarbon leases embracing more, if less than
all, of the minerals the Legislature and this Court determined should be embraced within the new and exclusive
(after 1967) "oil, gas and hydrocarbon" lease. This Court
expressly noted that the 1967 Legiislative Amendments had
given the defendants the authority to do so. (21 Utah 2d
3()4, at 367.) See Section 65-1-96, Utah Code Annotated,
( 1970 Supp.). In point of fact, the defendants have, since
1967, readily resolved this area of possible uncertainty by
offering to convert a prior, outstanding lease for certain
of the hydrocarbons to a blanket instrument denominated
"oil, gas and hydrocarbon" lease or for a lease embracing
additional, if not all, hydrocarbons. Had the defendants
fully complied with the 1967 Legit.:;lative Amendments, as
they were directed to do by this Court in the 1968 Morgan
decision, the case at bar would never have arisen. However, the defendants attempted to obviate this Court's holding that only one lease for these hydrocarbons was permissable under the 1967 Legislative Amendments, by including in their blanket lease bituminous sands (the I.Solid
hydrocarbon specifiically involved in the 1968 Morgan case)
but excluding and reserving oil shale (the solid hydrocaruon specifically involved in the case at bar). This action
by the defen<iants defies the holdings of this Court in the
1968 Morgan case and the defendants have shown no rea•son at all why this Court should recede from that decision.
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POINT III.
"THE PURPOSE" OF THE SEVERAL* OIL,
GAS AND HYDROCARBON LEASES ISSUED
BY THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS IS
THE SAME, VIZ., THE PRODUCTION OF OIL
AND GAS.
The pertinent portion of the 1967 Legislative Amendments should be set out in full because it points up the
dispositive fact and law issue:
"The state land board may issue mineral leases including without limitation oil, gas and hydrocarbon
leases for prospecting, exploring, developing, and
producing mineral•3 covering any portions of the
state lands or the reserved mineral interests !in state
lands. In furtherance of the principle of multiple
use of state lands, the land board may grant a lease
for the prospecting, exploration, development and
production of any mineral notwithstanding the issuance of other lease or leases on the same land for
other mineral'3 and shall incl ude in such lease suitable stipulations for simultaneous operation. The
board shall not issue more than one outstanding
lease for the same purpose on the same land. * * *"
(Section 65-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1970 Supp.)
(Emphasis added.)
1

This statute expressly prohibits the defendants from issuing more than one lease "for the same purpose." There can

*"Oil, Gas and Hydrocarbon Lease", "Oil and Gas Lease", "Asphaltic
Sands-Bituminous Sands Lease", "Oil Shale Lease" (Findings of
Fact 1, 2 and 4; Conclusions of Law, 4, 5, and 7, R. 107-110).

9

be no question about the language, meaning or intent of
that prohibition. Thus, the crucial question of fact in this
case is whether the several oil, gas and hydrocarbon leases
isgued by the defendants are "for the same purpose". The
Trial Court found that they were and are (R. 108) and the
evidence is undisputed that the purpose of each of these
leases is identical, to wit, the production of oil and gas.
Defendants' own expert witnesis, Dr. Osmond, testified:
[By the Court]. Doctor, did I understand your
testimony correctly when you said that - well, let
me not lead you. What is the purpose for developing oil •shale or processing it? What's the purpose?"
"Q.

"A. The purpose would be to make fuels, I bel1ieve
- fuels and petrochemical feed stocks. I think this
is the primary objective of most of the processes
that have been talked about" (R. 184).

And
"Q.

What does anybody lease oil shale for?

"A.

To hope to get the oil out of it.

"Q.

And what does anybody drill an oil well for?

"A.

To get the oil out of the ground."

* * *
And what does anybody lease bituminous
sands-asphaltic sands for in the State of Utah?

"Q.

"A.

To get the oil out" (R. 192).

Dr. Christiansen testified :
Now, what is the purpose of treating oil shale
'in siitu' [sic]?

"Q.
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"A. Well, the ultimate purpose is to produce gasoline and oil for the industry.
"Q.

* * * Same purpose, whether you're ex-

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

And oil shale has no other value?

"A.

Yes, that's correct" (R. 152-153).

tracting this fluid from oil shale, bituminous sands,
or liquids?

Dr. Christiansen also testified that the only known use,
value or market for Kerogen (the organic of oil shale) is
the ultimate production of petroleum products (R. 141142). Dr. Osmond, the defendants' expert, agreed (R. 170171; 184).
Defendants argue that the "purpose" test might pre·
elude state leases for mining of coal on the same lands under lease for petroleum (Br. 13-14). Here, too, the "purpose" test disposes of defendants' argument. In Brennan
v. Udall, 379 F. 2d 803 (10th Cir., 1967) (cited and quoted
at page 6 of defendants' brief), the Court of Appeals held:
"It is conceded that oil shale as a rock, unlike coal,
has liittle intrinsic value. Its value at the time of
the classification in 1916, and now, is solely as a
possible source of oil." 379 F. 2d 803 at 804.

POINT IV.
THE "PURPOSE" TEST ADOPTED BY THE
LEGISLATURE IS SOUND AND REALISTIC.
Senate Bill 77 (Laws of Utah, 1967, Chapter 183, P·
521, et seq.) was the product of extended hearings at which

J
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the State and all segments of the petroleum industry were
heard.* The thrust of the bill was to assure that conflicts
between the clwims of 'Several lessees of State lands would
not paralyze the development of Utah's extensive petroleum
reserves. Under questioning as to the purposes of Senate
Bill 77 and plaintiffs' interest in the development of a Utah
oil industry by counsel for the defendants, John H. Morgan,
Jr., one of the plaintiffs testified:
"What we're trying to develop is an oil shale industry. We can't do it with conflicb3, don't you see?
We were helpful and instrumental ,in getting Senate
Bill 77 passed in the year 1967, and the reason was,
was because we knew that because of the enactment of this bill, we would eliminate conflict. Prior
to that time, I mean, there just wasn't anything we
could do about it" (R. 216).
The basic evidence relating to inherent conflicts which
would arise if two leases for the same purpose are itSsued
is essentially undisputed in the record in this case. Oil from
oil shale will be produced from the Green River Formation
by various methods currently being tested. These methods
are known a'3 "in g,itu" because they extract petroleum from
the rock while the rock remains in place, and the liquid is
*Plaintiffs supplied the Trial Court with the "OFFICIAL REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LAND BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH IN
THE MATTER OF A PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED ASPHALTIC SANDSBITUMINOUS SANDS LEASES AN:D OIL SHALE LEASES dated August 17,
1965, Exhibit P-18 and the pleadings and transcript of the 1968
Morgan case. Counsel for the defendants stipulated that the Trial
Court might consider these materials ( R. 122, lines 15-18). These
m<iterials, while not designated by the defendants, are before this
Court on Order of the Trial Court. The statement of the plaintiffs
appears at Exhibit P-18, pp. 239-248.
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then drawn off as from a lic1uid pool. The Green River
Formation is also the producer of liquid petroleum. Thus,
if the defendants axe allowed to issue two leases on the
same lane'., one lease for production of oil from oil shale
and another lease for production of oil from liquid petroleum, neither lessee will be able to develop and produce the
oil reserves becaur.se ( 1) the operation of one would critically interfere with the operations of the other, and (2),
inasmuch as both are seeking oil from the same formation,
if oil is produced the crucial question would arise: Whose
oil? This, in capsule, in the substance of much of the hearings which gave rise to the adoption of Senate Bill 77, the
careful reasoning of this Court in the 1968 Morgan ca'3e,
and the testimony of both expert witnesses in the case at
bar.
1

One of the witnesses at the time of the hearings which
culminated in the passage of Senate Bill 77 were held, was
the defendants' expert, Dr. Osmond. (Exhibit P-18 to 1968
Morgan case at pp. 218-221.) Dr. Osmond was most emphatic about the need for a single lease for hydrocarbons
when he testified rin 1965 :
"Q. [Dr. Osmond's testimony read back to hrim]
'Also it has been presented to you, or you may have
gathered that the conflict proposed by the speakers
here i'.S only between the oil and gas lease and the
bituminous sands-asphaltic sands lease. The princi·
pies on which this conflict, if there is a conflrict, are
based, these principles apply equally well to oil shale
and to gilsonite.' Did you say that?

"A.

I said that.
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"Q. All right, now, I'm going on. 'I believe the
gentlemen from Tenneco' - that's Tennessee Transmission, used to be; right?

"A.

Yes.

"Q. ' - intimated that they thought down the road
this question might arise. I believe the question is
here. We cannot separate the oil shale leases and
the gilsonite leases and only talk about the bituminous sands leases. They are all part of the same
situation of solid 'hydrocarbons'. This particular
piece of oil shale, as you can see, is bleeding oil ... "

"*

* *

I see, Well, I suppose - let me ask you specifically and your counsel may come back. You were
concerned at the time you testified before the Land
Board that if a lease were issued on oil, gas and
hydrocarbons or oil and gas and a separate lease on
shale and/or a separate lease on bituminous sandsasphaltic sands, there would be a conflict, and in
fact, the conflict was upon us. Is that a fair summary?
"Q.

"A.

There wa•s a conflict" (R. 189-190) .*

Dr. Christiansen testified:
Dr. Christiansen, do you have a professional
opinion as to whether or not it's possible to produce
oil, gas, and related hydrocarbons by two entirely
different techniques on the same acreage? Answer
that yes or no.
"Q.

*On redirect examination, Dr. Osmond corrected his 1965 testimony
that oil shale "bleeds"; otherwise, his testimony as to the seriousness
of the lease conflict problem remained the same at the time of his
testimony in this case in 1970 (R. 189-190; 192-193).
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"THE COURT: Do you have an opinion, yes or no?
"THE WITNESS: Yes.
"Q.

* * *

What do you base that opinion on?

"A. The nature of the occurrence of the oil and
gas and hydrocarbons in the, say, for example, in
the Green R1iver shale.
Are you taking into account your own exper.
ience, professional publications, and well known
facts and established facts ;in the petroleum industry?
"Q.

"A. That, in addition to the United States Bureau
of Mines publications.
All right, now, then, what is your opinion with
respect to several techniques of 'in situ' [sic] development within the same acreage for oil and gas and
other hydrocarbons?
"Q.

1

"A. Considering the Green River Formation and
adjacent units, in my opinion ;it would be imposstible
to use two separate and distinct techniques to recover the hydrocarbons that might be present there.
It would be excessive from an expense point of view
to isolate the two, and for that reason, two separate
and distinct techniques could not be used.
Where are we producing oil and gas in liquid
form in the State of Utah; what formation?
"Q.

"A. Well, in connection with the oil shale unit, the
Red Wash Oil Field is producing oil and gas from
the morporous facies of the Green River Formation.
"Q. Where is the shale in Utah located? Same for·
mation; correct?

"A.

Yes.
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So if there are two leases and one of them ris
an 'in situ', [sic] fire floor or nuclear device to
liquefy the rock, and in the same formation another
lessee is attempting to extract liquid or mobile oil,
is it a fair statement to say there is an inevitable
conflict here.
"Q.

"A.

Yes.

And within the area rin Utah known to have
oil shale, the production of oil in liquid form is in
exactly the same formation, to wit, the Green River,
as is now producing liiquid?
"Q.

"A.

Yes, it fa in the same formation.

"Q.

The '.Shale and liquid are in the same forma-

"A.

Yes" (R. 151-152).

tion?
And

"THE COURT: Wiill you generally have liquid oil
reservoirs at a different depth than you wiill have
oil shale in the same general formation?
"THE WITNESS: Well, it's possible. The Green
River Formation is a very complicated formation.
It grades laterally and vertically, and in that gradational interval, it would be certainly possible. Many
think that the Green River Formation, the oil shale
unit is a source spread, that these lenses of porous
and permeable rock would have both oil and gas in
them in the sense of the fluid hydrocarbon content"
(R. 158-159).
1

Counsel for defendants argue that unless the "purpose"
test is deleted from the statute by this Court, it could preclude the issuance of State leases for other materials such
as coal, wood and garbage - because such materials could
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be made to yield oil (Br. 14). This argument only serves
to further buttress the wisdom of the "purpose" test. Patently, the State does not grant a lease for timber or a garbage dump for the "purpose" of producing petroleum. The
following exchange between the Court and defendants' expert, Dr. Osmond, illustrates the invalidity of defendants'
argument:
"THE COURT: I have a question, 1if I may, Doctor?
I don't know whether the State leases wood or garbage, but if there were a lease on those items well, let me back up. Can counsel agree - I'm sure
it doesn't on garbage - does the State issue a lease
on wood?
"Mr. McCarthy: Yes.
"THE COURT: Are you aware of this, that the
State i1ssues a lease on wood?
"THE WITNESS: Yes.
"THE COURT: ·would the primary purpose for
doing that be to get oil?
"A. I presume it would be for the lumber and the
timber" (R. 193-194). See also R. 196.
POINT V.
OIL SHALE LEASES AND ALL OTHER OIL,
GAS AND HYDROCARBON LEASES ISSUED
BY DEFENDANTS ARE FOR THE SAME MINERAL.
It may be argued as to whether the various hydrocar-

bons are, in a technical, geologic sense, "minerals". Both experts who testified, gave technical definitions and explana-
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tions of hydrocarbons. Both agreed that, in technical geologic useage, oil, gas, methane, natural gas, kerogen and
other hydrocarbons, are not true "minerals". However,
these refinements are, in a real sense, just pedantic exercises, having no significance to the case at bar. The various
hydrocarbons here involved are known in the 'industry as
"minerals" (R. 142) and both the Utah Legislature, in the
1967 Legiislative Amendments, and this Court in its construction of the said Amendments in the 1968 Morgan case,
have acceded to use of the word "minerals" as embracing
the hydrocarbons with which this case is concerned.
In the 1968 Morgan case, in argument to the two District Court judges in this case, and in their brief to this
Court, defendants' principal contention and the bulk of
their evidence, aim at establishing that the various hydrocarbons have certain distinguishing properties. In the 1968
Mor.qan case, these defendants produced a block of solid
bituminous sands-asphaltic sands and a vfal of liquid petroleum to illustrate the physical differences to the Court. Defendants employed the 1identical illustration in this case.
Actually, plaintiffo in the 1968 Morgan case did not, and
in the case at bar do not, challenge the contention; the layman can see that oil shale (and bituminous sands-asphaltic
sands) is a sol1id (or semi solid, R. 141) whereas liquid
petroleum 1is just that - liquid. Actually, these hydrocarbons range from solids or semi solids (oil shale, bituminous
sancls-asphaltic sands) to liquids (petroleum) to gases
(methane, natural gas) and are chemically the same, (Dr.
Osmond, R. 171) differiing only in the ratio of hydrogen to
carbon constituents (and some impurities). See, e.g., testi-
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mony of Christiansen, R. 153; Court of Appeals in Brennan
V. Udall, supra.

Dr. Christiansen, in response to a question from the
court, summarized:
"Th is fluid that he says you get out of the oil shale
and the fluid that you might pump out of a reservoir. The only difference is in - the basfo composition iis the same. The difference is in the ratio of
the carbon and hydrogen, but the fluid fa put into
a refinery and is refined in the same manner, producing the ultimate products of the petroleum industry, oil and gasoline" (R. 156).
1

The following are established as facts, both in the case at
bar, and in the 1968 Morgan case:
A.

Bituminous sands are a solid, or semi solid,
hydrocarbon whiich produces oil;

B.

Oil shale is a solid, or semi solid, hydrocarbon
which produces oil;

C.

Oil pumped from the ground is, for all practical
purposes, the same as oil produced from bituminous sands or from oil shale.

The crux of this Court's deaisiion in the 1968 Morgan
case was that the mere fact that oil was produced from a
solid hydrocarbon (bituminous sands) rather than originally in liquld form did not relieve the defendants from the
statutory prohibition: "The Board shall not
more
than one outstanding lease for the same purpose on the
same land." ( 65-1-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1970 Supp.)
The only distinction the defendants even claim to draw
between the holding of this Court in the 1968 Morgan case
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and the case at bar iis that this case involves oil shale (a
solid, or semi solid, hydrocarbon producing oil) and the
earlier case involved bituminous sands (a solid, or semi
solid, hydrocarbon producing oil). That, if ever there was
one, is a distinction without a difference.
POINT VI.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1967
AMENDMENTS FULLY S U P P 0 RT S THE
HOLDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
Defendants question the plaintiffs' motives in undertaking this litigation (Def. Br. 16). This charge, which
is wholly extraneous to the issues of the case and grossly
unfair, is fully refuted by the facts. (See, e.g., testimony
of John H. Morgan, Jr., R. 125-133, 212-218; Exhibit P-18,
1968 Morgan case, pp. 239-248.) The plaintiffs were participants in the 1965 hearings which produced the 1967
Legislative Amendments, which were supported by both
the defendant!.3 and the industry. These amendments, as
this Court noted in the 1968 Morgan case, were intended
to eliminate conflicts and thereby make possible the develorlment and production of Utah oil resources. Certainly,
and without question, the plaintiffs do, as defendants contend, have a vital financial stake in that development and
production. And so does every other Utah taxpayer. If the
defendants are permitted to violate the statutory prohibirin the 1968 Morgan
tions, ignore this Court's clear
case, and, in a shorts1ighted program to garner immediate
lease rentals, create hopelessly conflicting lease claims, everyone will suffer, because the only really substantial in-
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come the State stands to realiize from its oil land'.3, must
come from production royalties - and production from
lands under conflicting leases iis 1impossible. See, e.g., 1968
Morgan case, 21 Utah 2d 364, at 366; testimony of Dr. F.
W. Christiansen, particularly at R. 151-152; "OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LAND BOARD OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE MATTER OF A PUBLIC HEARING ON
PROPOSED ASPHALTIC SANDS-BITUMINOUS SANDS LEASES
AND OIL SHALE LEASES, August 17, 1965" Exhibit P-l8,
Oiviil No. 175337 (1968 Morgan case) now deposited with
this Court herein. It is underntandable that the defendants
deSlire to make as impressive a showing on their annual
income reports as they can. But by thereby rendering impossible the actual production from State lands, they engage in the oldest of f inanoial miscalculations - tripp,ing
over dollars to gather pennies.
1

1

Elimination of these conflicts, which were certain to
paralyze Utah oil production efforts, was, as this Court
determined in the 1968 Morgan case, the principal objective
of the 1967 Legislative Amendments. The statements and
testimony of the spokesmen for all segments of the petroleum industry in the OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS.
(Exhibit P-18, 1968 Morgan case) make this conclusion
crystal clear.
POINT VII.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN
ITS CONSTRUCTION OF THE 1969 AMENDMENTS.
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Defendants' brief (Br. 17-20) suggests that their
Points I, II, and III are presented more or less for the sake
of providing this Court with the opportunity to reconsider
its 1968 Morgan decision and that defendants' principal
argument is, in substance, that a 1969 statute (Chapter
220, Lavvs of Utah, 1969) repealed the 1967 Legislative
Amendments.
There can be no question that if the 1969 enactment
was intended to repeal any other statute, it did not expressly so provide. Thus the question defendants raise is
\vhether the 1969 enactment was intended to repeal, and
can only be construed as repealing, the 1967 Legislative
Amendments.
Justice Crockett, speaking for a unanimous Court in
In Re Utah Savings and Loan Association, 21 Utah 2d 169,
442 P. 2d 929 ( 1968) announced the governing rule of statutory construction :

"* * * It is true here, as 1it i\S in so many areas
of the law, that one statute has been enacted at one
time with a particular purpose in mind and that
another had been enacted at another time with a
different purpose in mind. When this has been done
and there is an apparent conflict, it 1is not proper to
put all the emphasis to one statute, as though it
stated all of the law on the subject to the exclusion
of the other. They should be looked at together, in
their relationship to each other, with a view to
reconciling any \Such apparent conflict and giving
each its intended effect insofar as that can be accomplished without nullifying the other. [Note 1]
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 457, 59 P.
96, states: 'One act is not to be allowed to defeat
1
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another, if by reasonable construction the two can
be made to stand together.' To the same effect see
also Western Beverage Co. of Provo, Utah v. Han.
sen, et ux., 98 Utah 332, 96 P. 2d 1105 . . . " 21
Utah 2d 169, at 171-172.
In the case at bar, however, there is absolutely no con.
flict wiith which to contend. A simple reading of both statutes establishes the patent fact - which the Trial Court
determined - that the two statutes in no way conflict and
are entirely consistent, if accorded the literal construction
of their language. As the Trial Court determined, the 1969
amendments can and should be read as relating to oil shale
leases theretofore issued which remained outstanding. The
1967 Legislative Amendments deal with the powers of and
limitations upon the defendants in issuing mineral leases.
The 1969 enactment merely empowers the defendants to
enter into programs for the development of oil shale. So
read, giving the words of the statute their plain and literal
meaning, there 'is no inconsistency at all between the two
•statutes.
Defendants argue (Br. 14-17) that this Court should
pay great deference to the construction placed by defendants during the past few months on the 1969 enactment
- viz., that the 1967 Legislative Amendments were re·
pealed and that the opinion of this Court in the 1968
Morgan case was overturned. No authority was cited by
defendants for that surprising contention. Our research
has found none.
The law pertaining to so-called "borrowed" statutes is
inapposite, because the federal statutes and agency regula·
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tions dted by the defendants are vastly different from the
Utah statutes involved he1·e. The law pertaining to the
weight to l>e accorded statutory construction by an administrative agency over a long period of time also is inapplicable because in this case, this Court fully advi'Sed these
same defendants in 1968 as to the proper construction of
the 1967 Legiislative Amendments and, further, the defendants' "construction" of the 1969 enactment has only occurred within the past year.
These same contentions were before this Court in the
1967 case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. State Tax Commission, 19 Utah 2d 92, 426 P. 2d 231. In the Union Pacific
case, the administrative interpretation by the Tax Commission had continued, with acquiescence of all parties, over
some 22 years. In the case at bar, the defendants' "interpretation" occurred sometime in late 1969 or early 1970
(the record does not disclose the date). The Union Pacific
case, citing and quoting recognized authorities, completely
refutes the arguments of the defendants in the caJSe at bar.
See, particularly, 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Section 459, cited
and quoted at 19 Utah 2d 93-94; 82 C. J. S. Statutes, §358,
at page 759, cited and quoted at 19 Utah 2d 94-95, (Justice
Callister and Justice Henriod, in their dissent, do not disagree with the principles of statutory construction announced in the main opinion, but only with the application
of those principles to the particular statute involved and
the signif,icance of a long-standing - 22 yearn - administrative interpretation.)
In Olson Construction Company, et al. v. State Tax
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Commission of Utah, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P. 2d 1112 (1961)
cited and quoted in the Union Pacific case at 19 Utah 2d
95, Justice Callister, for a unanimous court, wrote:
"This court, while recognizing the possibility that
one might be penalized by reliance upon an invalid
adminristrative regulation, was held that an admin.
istrative interpretation out of harmony and con.
trary to the express provisioms of a statute cannot
be given weight and, to do so, would in effect amend
that statute (citing)." (12 Utah 2d 42, at 45.)
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are, and for a good many years have been,
in the forefront of efforts to bring major oil companies
into Utah and secure the development and production of
Utah's vast, and virtually untapped, oil resources. They
labored to secure passage of the important 1967 Legislative
Amendments which eliminated lease
- the major
road block to development. When the Land Board chose
to ignore the 1967 Legislative Amendments, plaintiffs, by
the commitment of considerable time and personal expense,
carried their position to this Court to assure that the legis·
lative intent would be carried out. Again, in the case at
bar, the plaintiffs have been required to expend valuable
time and money to assure a future for Utah's oil industry.
These efforts will, they hope, benefit themselves financially
as well as all others interested in the development of Utah's
oil resources. But, in a real sense, these efforts involve the
oft-forgotten duty of the citizen to act pro bona publica:
The plaintiffs' objectives are nothing less than to do all
they can to provide the proper lease-title climate which will
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attract the large petroleum companies to spend the enormous isums necessary to produce Utah's oil reserves.
The law and the facts in this case solidly support the
position of the plaintiffs, and the Findings and Conclusions
and Judgment of the Triial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ADAM M. DUNCAN
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents

